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Chapter 10  
Summary  
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis faced the challenge of answering a question that may have seemed 
to many to already have been asked and answered.  However, it was that very 
assumption that this thesis proposed to challenge and doing so required looking at the 
manner in which the question was framed and the context in which it was asked.  The 
question had been asked in order to address the question of whether it was necessary for 
the UNFCCC or any other international body to address intellectual property regarding 
climate change.  The way in which it was answered, was to ask empirical questions about 
the existence and distribution of patents, and whether this was a barrier to technology 
transfer.  The error in focusing on the empirical issues was two-fold: it did not address 
the actual problem which was not the existence of patents, but the uses to which they 
were put, especially licensing; and it did not address the actual issue of regulatory 
freedom to address intellectual problems if they were to arise.   
Understandably wishing to avoid having to revisit the entire intellectual 
property system, empirical studies aimed to design around the issue by showing that 
there are no empirical concerns regarding intellectual property protection in developing 
countries. If there are few patents in the industries studied, if there are few patents in 
the countries studied, if the patents that exist are not in the hands of concentrated 
ownership, then the necessity for developing countries to take unilateral actions beyond 
the existing intellectual property framework does not exist, and there is no need to 
renegotiate international intellectual property norms.  The Copenhagen Economics/IPR 
Company Study,1353  the Chatham House Study1354, the EPO/UNEP/ICTSD Study1355, 
the Dechezleprêtre et. al. Study1356 and the John Barton ICTSD study1357 all work within 
this framework. They all seek to answer the question of whether intellectual property 
                                                        
 
1353 Copenhagen Economics and the IPR Company “Are IPRs a Barrier to the Transfer of Climate Change 
Technology?” Study Commissioned by European Commission DG Trade, January 2009.  
1354 Lee, B et al. “Who owns our Low Carbon Future: Intellectual Property and Energy Technologies” 
Chatham House, September 2009. 
1355 Karachalios, K et al. (eds.) “Patents and Clean Energy: Bridging the Gap between Evidence and Policy: 
Final report” UNEP/ EPO / ICTSD 2010. 
1356 Dechezleprêtre, A et al. “Invention and Transfer of Climate Change–Mitigation Technologies: A Global 
Analysis” 5 Rev Environ Econ Policy 109 (2011). 
1357 Barton, J “Intellectual Property and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing Countries: An 
Analysis of Solar Photovoltaic, Biofuel and Wind Technologies” Trade and Sustainable Energy Series, Issue 
Paper No. 2, ICTSD December 2007. 
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poses a barrier to action empirically.  However, I argued that the barrier question has 
always been a contingent one rather than one that is susceptible solely through empirical 
determination.  Thus, in this thesis, I divided the broader question into two elements: 
the necessity to act; and where there is necessity to act, is there capacity to act?  The first 
is an empirical question but the second is a legal question. The issue of whether the 
UNFCCC, or any other international regime, should act to address intellectual property 
lies, primarily in the answer to the second question rather than the first.  This is because 
necessity to act (of the country, not the UNFCCC) is actually an issue that is primarily 
legal rather empirical.  The room and the ability to act is determined by how necessity is 
framed in the international rules as much by the conditions in the national market, the 
behaviour of rightholders in that market, framed within the policy goal of addressing 
climate change. To the extent that global assessments of the distribution of patents, 
ownership of patents, can tell us where problems are likely to arise, if at all, they provide 
useful information.  To the extent that such global assessments tell us something about 
the nature and scope of licensing and other uses of intellectual property protected 
technologies, they provide useful information as to the kinds of interventions that may 
be needed.  However, given the variety of different countries, with different markets, 
with varying technology needs, and varying distributions of patent protection use, a priori 
determinations that a country or set of countries they will not need to take particular 
kinds of action to address intellectual property issues can never truly be made.   
However, I do not aim to dismiss such global empirical approaches. I believe 
they can provide crucial information to policymakers regarding potential opportunities 
and blockages in international technology markets.  It is on this basis that I have made 
several proposals in Chapter 9 for the ways in which the UNFCCC should address 
technology transfer and especially investment, market access and licensing related to 
intellectual property protected technologies.  After all, based on the existing studies 
examine in Chapter 4, it was possible to tentatively conclude that: 
- existing data in the very limited set of sectors studied show concentrated 
ownership of patents in developed countries, largely OECD.  Of patents that 
exist in developing countries, the vast majority are in China.  In terms of 
ownership by developing countries, China may have the largest ownership but 
this is still relatively small in comparison to OECD rightholders; 
- The majority of technologies in the very limited set are likely not patented in 
least developed countries.  They are almost certain to be patented in China, 
and in the main emerging economies of Brazil, India and China; 
- with respect to licensing in some of the sectors (especially wind and solar), 
there appears to be some evidence of licensing to major developing countries, 
but with some suggestion of geographical and other restrictions;   
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- What licensing there is appears to be from national or smaller companies, not 
necessarily in possession of best available technologies, and not from 
transnational enterprises with significant production capacity of their own.   
The lesson from these studies lies in the insight they provide regarding the 
dearth of technology transactions, and the pace of diffusion of intellectual property 
protected technologies.  What data we have from Chapter 3 also points to trends in 
patenting; increasing overall patenting in climate technologies, and a significant jump in 
R&D accompanied by significant transfers of IP into private sector hands. 
I also argue that, for the most part, the studies on the distribution of patenting 
fail by their own measures. The studies tell us very little about how patents in the sectors 
studied are exercised.  In addition, there are basic methodological differences regarding 
the use of patent data that limit the scope of conclusions that they can make.  This 
critical analysis of the relatively small pool of studies so far has not really been carried 
out before, especially within the framework that has been used here by looking at the 
scope of technologies, the timing of distribution of technologies, and the geographic 
focus. This critique provides a way of properly assessing the claims made as to nature 
and scale of the intellectual property problem for technology transfer; and this thesis 
concludes that while a useful start they do not provide sufficient purchase for a policy 
decision based purely on their findings.   
The problem of course is that the default of taking no action is entirely 
congruent with the untenable recommendations 1358  that no action is necessary to 
address intellectual property at this time. The mistake is to conflate taking action 
regarding intellectual property with taking action to address intellectual property norm-
setting.  It seems entirely appropriate to conclude from their findings that some action 
regarding intellectual property needs to take place, especially regarding licensing and 
transaction, without necessarily concluding that norms on intellectual property need to 
be changed.  
 The primary sin is one of scope: the landscapes and studies cover only a small 
sector of relevant technologies, mostly focused on mitigation, and within that power 
generation.  The discussion in chapter 2 constructed a set of technologies of particular 
relevance to developing countries based on TNAs, NAMAs, National Communications 
and several scenarios based on mitigation potentials.  That extensive discussion was 
necessary to drive the point home that the scope of technologies is necessarily wide and 
that studies and recommendations for action must be commensurate with that.   
                                                        
 
1358 See e.g. Copenhagen Economics and the IPR Company “Are IPRs a Barrier to the Transfer of Climate 
Change Technology?” Study Commissioned by European Commission DG Trade, January 2009. 
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The importance of timing is also crucial. Almost all studies looking at 
intellectual property and climate change ignore the issue of timing and the role of timing 
in influencing the assessment of how a barrier operates.  Intellectual property creates a 
friction in the number and scope of technology transactions that take place.  We have to 
be concerned not just about the static volume of patenting but also the effect of 
patenting on the rate of diffusion. That means that we must ask about the extent to 
which patenting may delay adoption and diffusion of technologies by relevant peaking 
dates, in the case of mitigation, 2015-2018, in terms of adaptation, 2025-2030. Where 
the existence and exercise of patent rights creates frictions that delay the adoption 
adaptation and replication of climate technologies in developing countries, we have to 
consider that this may indeed pose a barrier, even if it is not an absolute bar.  This thesis 
concludes that while there is insufficient data to address this in the existing studies, there 
is some small indication (e.g. the Chatham House study) that diffusion is not happening 
fast enough due to the limited number of transactions into developing countries. 
 Finally, the studies generally have committed the sin of not taking geography 
and the potential of major emerging economies seriously enough.  While all focus on the 
nature and scale of patenting into major developing countries, especially in relation to 
developed countries, there is rarely enough in depth study of the intellectual property 
structure of relevant technology sectors at the national level and the role of exports of 
technology and goods to other developing countries. Some of the best data could have 
been obtained by focusing on the key developing country markets of Brazil, China, 
India and South Africa, and, in those jurisdictions and asking: 
- Based on the technology needs identified for that country, what is the portion 
of patenting in those technologies and technology sectors; 
- Based on the patented sectors, what is the nature  (cost and terms) and scale of 
licensing of those technologies to domestic firms; 
- Looking at technological capacity; what is the trend in the capacity of domestic 
firms to adopt, adapt and replicate the technologies in the sectors identified in 
the technology needs. 
This kind of research program will still allow some comparative sectoral based 
work, but will be rooted in the actual technology needs of developing countries and 
provide sufficient depth to provide useful information about the necessity to act on 
norm-setting at the international level if the data show that developing countries are 
unable to take action to address key issues that arise in multiple jurisdictions at a 
significant scale.  Only such findings may provide sufficient impetus for a multilateral 
solution of sufficient scale in intellectual property norm-setting.  Without such 
information, this thesis finds it difficult to recommend with confidence a course of 
action at the UNFCCC or any other international body aimed at norm-setting, despite 
the finding that where the behaviour by an intellectual property right holder bars or 
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limits or TRIPS does indeed bar or limit the capacity of developing countries to make 
interventions to address: 
a. Affordability - ensuring that prices of products are not set 
so high that it is too expensive for all the relevant economic 
actors to afford.  
b. Adoptability - ensuring that prices of products and or 
know-how are not set so high that they make it 
commercially unviable for all relevant actors to adopt 
‘climate-friendly’ technologies. 
c. Adaptability – ensuring sufficient distribution of knowledge 
(information, skills, know-how) to enable a critical number 
of existing producers/service providers in the market to 
adopt, adapt and replicate climate technologies and ensure 
their participation in the market. 
 
The findings in Chapter 6 depended on identifying the kinds of interventions 
that developing countries would ostensibly use and examining them in the light of 
existing WTO and TRIPS jurisprudence.  This framework brings something new to the 
literature which has traditionally looked simply at the agreement itself and the 
flexibilities it contains. This thesis adds to the literature by first identifying a  universe of 
interventions that have historically been used to encourage technology transfer and that 
are relevant to technology transfer for climate change; examining whether or not TRIPS 
addresses them; and finally, discussing the scope of activity available under TRIPS as a 
legal matter. The novel approach that this thesis takes is to situate the legal analysis 
directly within the framework of the policy goal that such interventions are meant to 
achieve. Thus, availability was defined not just in legal terms but in terms of whether it 
enabled action at the right speed, at the right scope, and in the right countries.  Where a 
purely legal analysis might indeed have found that the TRIPS Agreement does not pose 
a significant limitation on the universe of potential actions, this allows me to examine 
the scope and nature of the actions that are legally available and note the ways in which 
the TRIPS Agreement limits their potential impact, and to conclude that their ability to 
make changes to market structures and behaviour is severely curtailed.  The IP-related 
interventions that would be most effective as levers have been marginalized and reduced 
in scope and effectiveness by the TRIPS Agreement.  The use of working requirements, 
one of the more powerful historical incentives for encouraging licensing and FDI has 
been curtailed.  The use of patent exclusions in key sectors of public interest such as 
pharmaceuticals and agriculture is no longer available.  Most importantly, few of the 
remaining flexibilities allow for the emerging economies to play the role as 
intermediaries and export products and know-how as they need to do if technologies are 
to be transferred to other developing countries at the scale and speed required. 
The most useful tools that are left legally and practically available by the TRIPS 
Agreement are the application of competition law and the use of performance and 
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technology transfer requirements, as well as requirements to have FDI take place in the 
form of JVs. The rest are smaller, marginal adjustments to domestic intellectual property 
systems.   
This is not to say that there do not remain significant interventions available to 
developing countries.  The list of activities in Chapter 6 that the TRIPS Agreement does 
not address or limit remains quite extensive.  Further research should examine the 
extent to which these options are actually being exercised by developing countries, 
looking at their effectiveness in timing, scale and scope.  It may be that developing 
countries have indeed not taken up and used to the fullest the available measures to 
encourage technology transfer.  It may be that some have even signed on to other 
international regimes, such as bilateral investment treaties, that place additional limits on 
the measures that TRIPS does not address. In addition, many may have signed on to 
bilateral and regional free trade agreements that further restrict their ability to use 
measures identified as legally available in this thesis.  It will be important to assess for 
each country the extent to which this has occurred and the extent to which they are free 
to take action to remove such restrictions. 
Finally, developing countries find themselves placed in a peculiar position in 
the relationship between TRIPS and the climate change regime.  In the event that a 
country finds that there are actions that it wishes to undertake in order to benefit from 
rights or implement obligations from one treaty that are prevented by their obligations 
under another treaty, they can appeal to conflict resolution mechanisms in international 
law that provide a framework for interpreters to either give priority to one set of 
obligations or to find a way to make the obligations mutually supportive and 
implementable.1359  This thesis concludes that the UNFCCC does not present such an 
obligation to developing countries because their obligations under the treaty to reduce 
emissions are conditional. Article 4.7 of the UNFCCC makes the implementation of 
their obligations under the UNFCCC dependent on being provided sufficient 
technology and financial support. Chapter 7 shows that they cannot use their obligations 
under the UNFCCC as a justification for taking actions that are not compliant with the 
TRIPS Agreement.  This limitation is also exacerbated by the fact that WTO law 
remains hostile to the intrusion of non-WTO law in its dispute settlement process 
providing very little purchase for entry of UNFCCC treaty language in any case, even if 
it applied.  As long as the approach in the WTO panel case EC – Approval and Marketing 
of Biotech Products1360 remains applicable, then, absent any other statement from within the 
institutions of the WTO, the UNFCCC cannot be used as applicable law between the 
                                                        
 
1359 Pauwelyn, J Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of 
International Law. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.). In line with Condon, B “Climate 
Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law” 12 J. Int'l Econ. L. 895 (2009). 
1360 See para. 7.70 – 7.71, Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R / WT/DS292/R / WT/DS293/R, Add.1 to Add.9, and Corr.1, 
adopted 21 November 2006, DSR 2006:III-VIII, 847 (EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products) 
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parties to a dispute at the WTO that challenges a unilateral measure that has an effect on 
a TRIPS-related right or obligation. 
 I also conclude, in Chapter 7, that the hope that framing technology transfer 
as a human rights matter and thus part of the general international law that the WTO 
must consider remains an untested assertion at best.  There is no indication that the 
rights most relevant in this framework of economic, social and cultural rights are of 
such universality and integral nature as to trigger the obligation of other regimes to 
integrate them as applicable law.  In addition, intellectual property law has a special place 
in human rights law where intellectual property-like rights are part of the human rights 
framework rather than external to it. Thus one cannot reach to the human rights 
framework to try and use it to impose other considerations when the human rights 
framework itself contains an obligation of a sort to protect rights in intangible creative 
property.  In the end, in Chapter 8, I suggest that recourse to broader structures of 
international law may be the only option, with developing countries working in the 
UNFCCC and other international fora to take a far more active role in integrating the 
values of regimes such as the UNFCCC into the WTO by using ‘interaction’ clauses that 
explicitly state the intention to construct a particular relationship to the other regime.  
The limits of this are clearly political: to the extent that countries are unable to negotiate 
relaxations of norms in the WTO itself, they may not be able to agree to do so in the 
UNFCCC or other fora. I provide some framing that developing countries can use to 
make an effective case for the jurisdiction and competence of one venue over another 
on issues such as sustainable development and technology transfer, and to take 
advantage of the differing constitutional frameworks of the UNFCCC regime compared 
to that of the WTO.   
The scale of the climate challenge can be daunting. The combination of the 
language of catastrophe, with the long time frame for action, and the initially slow 
growth of climate impacts creates an environment where caution and incrementalism 
prevail.  Nobody wants to spend all their time staring into the sun. And yet, in the case 
of climate change, it seems the incrementalists may not be the true realists. In addressing 
climate change true realism may require that we all become radicals, an uncomfortable 
thought, especially for traditional intellectual property scholars and lawyers. It is a habit 
of thought to which environmental lawyers and scholars have had more time to become 
accustomed.  It is my hope that this thesis, by working to bridge the frameworks of both 
areas of law goes some way to providing a proper basis for a fruitful conversation 
between the intellectual property and climate change regimes. 
 
 
